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. ure Technology, and The Human Good:

~e• ote' on the Human Roots of Political Reform
pcr£R A UGUST) E LAWLER

BerryCollege
Why is leisure good for human beings? This question is extraordinarily
difficult to answer coherently within the context of a democratic,
technology-dependent r~gime. Nevertheless, it is one we are compelled to
onfront throughtfully 1f we are to lead purposeful or "complete" human
live . If we cannot convince the world of the significance of our thoughtful
an wer to this fundamental question, it is a sign of our freedom or potential
for " elf-determination" that we can move beyond the general limits of our
(ime and place in transforming our own, particular lives. With this concluion both the followers of Jesus and the followers of Socrates agree.
We must begin by remembering that ours is a world in large part defined
by technology. If we define technology as the use of the energy liberated
and controlled by the methodical use of human intelligence to maximize the
comfortable self-preservation of the great mass of human beings, then we
an agree that what appear to be our two great economic and political alternatives-capitalism
and socialism-are
both essentially technological in
pirit. The genuine debate between capitalism and socialism is largely conducted within the "economic" perspective of determining which system
provides the greatest happiness for the greatest number, when happiness is
materialistically understood. Perhaps, in principle, there is no real difference between East and West. Both are linked together as "European"
proponents of the technological spirit of the modern scientific and
philosophic project.
Human beings must regard technology as a means to an end. The argument for the primacy of technological or visible and tangible success in
moral and political calculations is that such success is an indispensable
precondition for all those things human beings regard as good. Even
t. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas can agree with the rest of us that
self-preservation and comfort are real goods to beings with bodies. Certainly
this understanding of the human good is not exhaustive, but beyond it
agreement is not possible. Given our fallibility and our obstinacy, attempts
to define a more comprehensive understanding of a common good lead to
always potentially violent quarrels. Such quarrels, of course, can cause us to
forget our common dependence on the products of technology for our pursuit of any good. We can disagree on the answers to the "classical" questions concerning the nature of the soul and of human excellence-and
we
will, given our propensity to identify "human" excellence with "one's
own" excellence-and
still agree to contain our disagreements in a way
which prevents the "illusions" of pride from overwhelming our candid
acknowledgement of the implications of our common fears. We define our
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own good in any way we please which does not obstruct the effec tual Pu .
suit of the agreed-upon common good, and we cannot do this without Pe~mitting everyone else to do the same.
In this light, it would be easy to conclude that the purpose or
technology is the production of leisure. Overcoming with a co ntinuau
growing effectiveness the constraints of bodily necessity, techno logy Pr;
vides us with ever-expanding horizons of "free time." The nece sar
amount of individual toil is constantly decreasing, and we are living longe~
and more comfortably. Freed from fear, hunger, and even the necessity of
giving birth, each of us can devote our time to our own particu lar form or
"self-actualization."'
But there are reasons for questioning the view that technology can Produce leisure. Leisure, properly speaking, has almost always been
understood as an aristocratic phenomenon. An aristocrat is some one who
understands himself as not essentially "body" but as "soul." He decisively
rejects the visible and tangible evidence that he cannot be distinguished
from the rest of nature because, like the rest of nature, he is essentially a
body which comes into being and passes away. He denies that he is essentially limited by his mortality. He conquers his body's fear of death through
his soul's angry pride. He takes pleasure in his consciousness of his particular human excellence, and he tends to forget his dependence on his own
body, other human beings, and his "environment. " 2
For an aristocrat, all technological activity is for slaves, that is, those
who are compelled by some necessity to be slavishly concerned with their
own material well-being. The aristocrat loves his own idleness above all,
which is really the serene contemplation of his own self-suffic ient excellence. All is well with him; he is in need of nothing . Although he is never
"productive,"
he is not always purposeless or motionless. 1 He engages in
"beautiful and useless" activities, which are good for their own sa ke and
timeless in their meaning. They are leisurely in their freedom fro m necessity,
and his performance of them is a manifestation of his freedom .•
Leisure might be defined, in the aristocrat's eyes, as conscio usness of
one's freedom and forgetfulness of one's dependence on one's own body,
other human beings, and one's environment. It is redundant to add that ii
includes a lack of consciousness of the necessary constraints of time . Its
"completeness" essentially precludes its presence "in time." i Leisurely activity must be at least akin to the activity of the gods. 6
As Aristotle shows, the aristocrat must somehow possess the courage
of the warrior (Achilles) and the self-consciousness of the philosopher
(Socrates). Aristotle's description of the magnanimous man, whic h may be
best viewed as a profound effort to "make sense" of what is suggest ed by
Plato's portrayal of Socrates as the new Achilles in the Apology, might be
called a synthesis of the warrior's courage and the philosopher's eras and
logos.' The warrior who does not philosophize or give a logos of his own activity is not really self-sufficient; he cannot satisfy his erotic longing
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ugh his courage alone. He is dependent on the "honor"

of others for

t:ro/ogosdescribing the human worth of his courageous deeds. Hence he is
L eJaved to public opinion, a public composed of those whom he regards as
e~sinferiors and hence incapable of recognizing him for what he is.
his Despite its manifest insufficiency, the warrior who is not a philosopher
has no choice bu~ to enslave hims~lf to the unleisurely activities related ~o
ar to manifest his excellence publicly, and he really cannot take pleasure m
:e self-sufficifmcy of leisurely self-contemplation. Even that form of con~ict most akin to peace, political action, is unleisurely because it cannot be
nderstood as choiceworthy for its own sake. 8 It is action on behalf of a
uarticular "regime" or ideal, and the warrior who is not a philosopher can~ot even show that the ideal for which he fights is truly choiceworthy.
If the warrior needs the philosopher's self-consciousness, the
philosopher needs the warrior's courage. The philosopher asserts that the
pursuit of knowledge is choiceworthy for its own sake and the foundation
of a way of life worthy of human beings. Like the warrior, he asserts that he
i , and deserves to be, free from bodily necessity. He, too, defines himself
according, to this "soul." In order to show that his assertions are not merely
illusions or rationalizations but something real, he must show that he, too,
can face death fearlessly.
A complete account of the philosopher's freedom from bodily necessity
no doubt would include a large place for the warrior's spirited selfovercoming. He, however, emphasizes the distinction between the origin of
his freedom and that of the warrior's. The warrior's courage is fanatic
because he believes he knows that death is terrible; he believes he must be
willfully unreasonable to assert his humanity. The root of his assertion is
unbounded anger at the terrible truth of time; it is his revenge against time. 9
The philosopher realizes he really knows nothing of death. He also
knows it is irrational to oppose what is beyond his thought and power. He
faces death thoughtfully and openly as an occasion for the greatest curiosity
and as an experience that simply canriot be avoided. He knows it is foolish
to risk his life gratuitiously, but he is willing to see his life end when the time
has come. As Socrates showed, moreover, he is, if necessary, willing to risk
his life to defend his freedom.
The philosopher asserts that his own life, thought admittedly temporary, is good. He agrees with those who criticize the warrior's perspective
by holding that it is impossible to show that human life is good if pleasure is
not a human good. He argues that his characteristic activity is pleasurable,
but its pleasure is "of the soul." 10 It exists essentially apart from the body
and time and is a genuine manifestation of human excellence.
He calls his activity "contemplation," which he identifies as the activity
of the gods. What else would gods do, who have neither bodily desires nor
social or political responsibilities? Surely they would not have the concern
with power and will of self-conscious and contingent beings. 11 Contemplation includes or perhaps is even primarily self-contemplation; in its purely
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divine form, it is "thought
thinking itself," and it is sti ll "v
pleasurable." 12 The philosopher imitates divinity when he sees him elty
e_ssentially thought a~~ knows that he is good. He tr~nscends the per Pe:
t1ve of moral and pohucal concern, and he has no desire to use his though
1
to produce power to change the world. He, like the gods, is radical!
untechnological, and he is at leisure . He is the real aristocrat.
Y
Aristotle justifies the goodness of philosophy on the aristocra t 's 0 "'
terms : excellence, self-sufficiency, freedom, leisure and so fort h. He doen
so, in part, to defend theoretically the possibility that aristocratic st riving i:
not in vain. The aristocrat, in principle, can reasonably hope to enjoy in
leisurely tranquillity the con ciousness of his excellence. He ca n do so
however, only by seeing the limits of and transcending mora lity anct
politics; moral virtue and political activity are too close to bodily desire and
too unleisurely in their "other directedness" to be genuinely aristoc ratic. ,1
The "city" is part of the "external equipment" required for indi vidual
excellence .••
The individual really depends on political order and techno log ical pro _
perity for his excellence, but he cannot be too concerned with these need if
he is to be truly excellent. Such matters are too intimately connec ted with
the body to be of central human concern. Excellence is "proud" a nd hence
technologically "sterile." " It is best to consider the precondit io ns of excellence as the products of "chance" and not to delude oneself slavi hly by
believing that they can be willed into existence by reason . 16
The aristocratic philosopher holds that to liberate technology from it
subordination to some aristocratic perspective would destroy humanity. ,.
In one sense, our environmental and nuclear crises have shown tha t he has
not yet been proven incorrect. In another sense, in which he has al o not
been proven incorrect, he meant that the liberation of technology would be
the cause of humanity's self-brutalization in the pursuit of a free dom from
necessity that is impossible to obtain. This is why he chose to ca ll human beings godlike not by virtue of their power, but by virtue of their thou ght. He
points to a "complete life" that is really possible for human bei ngs, and he
shows us why it is unreasonable to dwell on the necessity of its eventual
cessation. 11
Consider that a "liberal education" is good for its own sake because it
gives the most genuine satisfaction to our "aristocratic"
desires . Its critic
say that it causes us to forget about our bodies, yet it does not rea lly conquer human contingency or eliminate our dependence on and he nce our indebtedness to other human beings. It obstinately and uncharita bly refu es
to prove its real worth. The aristocratic response to this criticism is that the
real endurance of the philosophic interpretation of human exce llence over
time can be traced to its proud assertion of the immortality and a utonom y
of the soul. 20 It is Socrates' prideful reinterpretation of aristocrat ic virtue a
self-consciousness and not the self-conscious hedonism of the phi los ophical
2
materialists that is "the vortex and turning point of Western civiliz ation . '' '
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We admire, and remember, above all, Socrates' warrior-like risk of life in
bat with Athens and the leisurely way he met death. Logos may well be
coJTJthlessunless it can show the nobility of the human soul. The stock obwor
·
h owever, st1·11retains
· some force; t h e assertion
· t h at
. tion to the aristocrat,
~~~ soul does not depend on the bo~y contains a strong elem~nt ~f illusion
obfuscation. It has the practical effect of underestimating
what
orchnology can accomplish in the service of human freedom. 22
te The technological view of the world stands in stark opposition to that
f the aristocrat's. The partisan of technology accepts only visible and
0
angible evidence, and hence he denies the artistocrat's assertion that he has
1
eallYbecome something other than body through 'his own efforts. He holds
:ve can only understand humanity in terms of what human beings have really
made; humanity is nothing more than its concrete achievements or history .
He denies that anything human is truly timeless, and he holds that God or
the gods are a creation of illusory human pride. He is obsessed with time
and with controlling the future. He knows there is no genuine appeal
beyond historical or technological success, and he knows that victory is
always associated with physical power. 23 Hence for him there is no leisure.
There is no escape from the pull of natural necessity, and there is no support
in nature for proud assertions of human particularity. Human beings will
never have enough power to achieve genuinely what they genuinely
de ire-to be freed from the fact of their absolutely contingent existence in
an infinite universe. They are compelled to conquer a hostile environment,
and they can achieve remarkable success. But human victories can never be
definitive. Life is ceaseless motion in pursuit of an impossible goal. 2 •
The partisan of technology's identification of humanity with effective
work reflects, then, a candid recognition of the consequences of human
mortality . It is indebted in a fundamental way to the Christian judgment
concerning "this worldly" existence. Human beings cannot find a genuine
home here because its attachments and satisfactions do not do real justice to
the deepest human longings. Consider the following telling remark by Pope
John Paul II, which is found in the midst of a message articulating the
human dignity of proper work:
There is yet another aspect of human work, an essential dimension of
other, that is profoundly imbued with the spirituality based on the
Gospel. All work, whether manual or intellectual, is inevitably linked
with toil. The Book of Genesis expresses it in a truly penetrating manner: the original blessing of work contained in the very mystery of creation and connected with man's elevation as the image of God is contrasted with the cur.se that sin brought with it. "Cursed is the ground
because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life." This
toil connected with work marks the way of human life on earth and
constitutes an announcement of death ....
(Laborem Exercens, Section 27)
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For Christians, the necessity of toil, consciousness of time, and the .
evitability of death casts a shadow over every hum an activt·
"Aristocratic" leisure is simply prideful self-deception; it is a fundament~rfraudulent attempt to e cape what appear to be the ultimate con sequenc Y
of one's own embodiment. 25 In genuinely Christian communiti es, such es
the Benedictine abbey, the aristocratic distinction between free leisure a~
servile work disappeared. 26 Work was sanctified a a way of ack nowledgt
one's enslavement to bodily nece sity and one's inability to free one ~~
from this enslavement through one's own efforts.
Yet there is also an activity which might be called Christia n leisure. Th
Benedictine monks were not only workers but thinkers. Like th:
"aristocratic" philosophers, they held that contemplation was good for its
own sake. Unlike the aristocrat, however, they held that genui nely leisurely
activity is available not only to a privileged or gifted few, but to all human
beings. Knowledge of God is literally self-evident through rea on, reveJa.
tion, and conscience. Thoughts of what is genuinely eternal and of the
promise of one's own personal immortality make it possib le to bear the
necessities of this life with genuine happiness. God grants fre ely to the
Christian that of which the aristocrat can only achieve a semblance in
moments of profound self-delusion. Humble acknowledgme nt of one'
dependence and "hope in things unseen" replace prideful consci ou snes of
one's own self-sufficient excellence as the foundation of persona l erenity
and hence genuine leisure. 21 The Christian can philosophize wit hout being a
warrior.
To understand our technological view of the world which ca me into being with the audacious founding of modern political philos ophy and
modern science by Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, an d others, it is
not too misleading to imagine the Christian critique of aristocra tic leisure in
the name of candid self-analysis combined with a dogmatic, at heistic rejection of the possibility of any form of salvation through supernat ural mean .
The result, as we have ·seen, is the view that all human beings are compelled
to labor continuously to satifsy materialistic desire. Aristocrati c pride i
subordinated to democratic fear; "theory" is formulated in ter ms of what i
required for successful practice (the production of power, the liberation of
energy). 21
For the partisan of technology, leisure, strictly speaking, doe s not exist, because we can only know what we make. To cease to work is to lose our
humanity, which is the product of our dissatisfaction with our mortality .
Moments without labor are not filled with self-contentmen t, but with
"boredom, restlessness, and anxiety. " 29 To be freed from thoughtles
materialism is freedom for the nihilistic realization that we do not know
that there is anything but thoughtless matter and arbitrary human will.1'
The resulting "uneasiness" 3 ' sends us immediately back to wor k. Leisure i
something from which we escape, because we are unable to lose our selve in
aristocratic or Christian dreams which would make it seem wort hwhile. We
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nnot escape from our consciousness of time; we identify being with time.
rven our vacations are filled with constant motion from place to place and
••recreational" activity and not genuine release from the rigors of
chnological striving. 3 2 Even our religion is progressively becoming a
:;theology of liberation," in which we understand "the Kingdom of God"
be a project to be realized through human labor, a project we know will
10
ever really be fulfilled because we know that no political or social reform
satisfy the whole of human desire. The atheism implicit in modern
cience has long been in the process of destroying the supernatural and
aristocratic components of our inherited beliefs. 33 One of these beliefs is the
goodness of leisure for human beings.
It still offends reason to say anything other than the goal of technology
i leisure. We can still say that its purpose is to satisfy bodily need. Once
chese needs are satisfied, then leisure is possible. The realm of necessity
givesway to the realm of freedom, not just in the "alienated" imaginations
of the few, but "in reality" for everyone. We aim at the radical freedom
which Socrates associated with genuine democracy, the regime defined by
cheabsence of any compulsion and under which every "leisurely" activity is
available at all times to every human being. 34 This is also what is described
0 lyrically as socialism by Marx in The German Ideology.
But we also have reason to believe that technology will never achieve its
goal. The goal of technology is to eradicate fear and pain: to really conquer
human mortality and contingency by dealing with the body on its own
1erms.This goal simply cannot be achieved by human beings. The more succe sful we appear to be in achieving it through our growing power, the more
it eludes us. The more preoccupied we become with technological success,
the more fearful we become. If we managed to eliminate human death as a
necessity (which Bacon and Descartes recognized as the central goal of
modern science), we would still not be able to eradicate it as a possibility,
because we cannot eliminate all contingency from the infinite universe.
Hencefear would increase immeasurably; death and courage would lose their
meaning as constituent parts of the human condition. We can risk our
necessarily "finite" lives for something we believe of "infinite" worth-a
friend, our family, a principle, and even our reputation. But when life is no
longer finite, our calculations change radically. i, They would be based on
fear and nothing else, because death would be understood as the indefinitely
avoidable evil. We would all live in lead houses and never venture outside.
Wewould certainly have no leisure. The more successful and prosperous we
materialists become, the more unhappy we are. 36 We are "really" no more
successful in conquering death than aristocrats and Christians, but we
deprive ourselves of what we call their illusions which give their lives what
they call human meaning.
According to the technological view of human affairs, we know our
own death to be ultimate evil, and the purpose of reason is to calculate how
best to avoid this evil. Yet our insatiable desire for the absolutely secure

:ill

IOI

possession of our life undermines our satisfaction with it. We ca nnot enj
our present health if we dwell on its contingent and temporary nature. l'~y
same can be said of our property, friendships, and loves. Whe n we defi/
reason solely in terms of what is required for bodily need, the n we cannoe
rest until we achieve the impossible. The "existentialist"
artic ulates th t
foundation of this technological view by defining humanity as simply con~
sciousness of this lack of definitive satisfaction. The technologic al and ex.
istentiali t ways of under tanding humanity with reference to the inevitability
of death are fundamentally misanthropic in denying the possi bility of ge.
nuinely human leisure. 37
We can conclude that the typical resident of a democratic
technologically-oriented society is in constant motion in pursuit of wealth
and power to increase his "well-being." As we have just seen, this motion
from one perspective, never ceases because it is never possible to ever hav;
enough well-being if one understands it materialistically. This perspective
however, is not complete if it is thought to be circumscribed sim ply by fear'.
Because even the single-minded partisan of technology is st ill a human
being, he cannot be understood as being without pride, without the
"aristocratic" desire for consciousness of his own self-sufficent excellence,
although the power of this desire varies greatly from human being to human
being. Because he is a partisan of "applied" science, he requires visible and
tangible evidence of the truth of his opinions about even himse lf. Con equently, he desires to have as much wealth and power as he can acquire-certainly
more than any other human being-in order to prove his
superiority or excellence.
A consistent aristocrat would say that this prideful mate rialist or
"capitalist entrepreneur" accumulates matter to gain quantitative evidence
of his human qualities and hence that his self-understanding is mo nstrously
incoherent because it is vulgarly reductionistic. He is willing to take any
risk, even "heroically" risk his life, in pursuit of merely "econom ic" goals,
those which can be traced ultimately to the body's fear and not the soul's
pride. 38 His avidly "competitive" pursuit of wealth can be criticize d by the
Christian as selfishness run rampant, but the aristocrat would cr it icize it as
a manifestation of his insufficent appreciation of himself. It is a sign of an
inability to regard oneself as a human being and hence of a lack of genuine
self-sufficiency. 19 No attempt to define human excellence in terms of quantities can ever provide the foundation for the tranquil stability which is the
precondition for genuine leisure. From the perspective of the pa rtisan of
leisure, the illusions of the consistent aristocrat are infinitely pref erable to
the illusions of the entrepreneur.
It is now commonplace to say that we long for illusions. We envy tho e
who can be genuinely proud or pious. We want to escape from the
homogeneou
materialism of our time which democratically defines all
things, including the human things, in terms of limitless quantities and to a
"horizon" which limits by distinctively defining the human pers pective.• •
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cause we have not purged ourselves of our pride, however, and perhaps
8
e cannot because we are not really free to will the soul out of existence, but
we
. .
.
erely distort 1t m monstrous ways, we caanot embrace a "horizon" we
:now merely to be a "horizon," a "value-system" we know merely to be a
,, alue-system." We are proud of the "will to truth" which constitutes the
dynamic of our tradition and is the source of our critical situation. Conseuently , we take a certain Socratic pride in affirming theoretical concluqions which deny the existence of human distinctiveness and show that we
are no better than brutes.• • We even understand ourselves to be superior to
ocrate s in that we are too self-conscious to take any pleasure in our conciousness of ourselves. •2 We are proud of our inability to enjoy our
moments of " free time."
Becau se we-perhaps
dogmatically-eschew
"salvation"
by
aristocrat ic or Christian means, we are compelled to seek relief from our
mi ery within the context of the homogeneous materialism on which the
technological view of the world is based . If self-consciousness is our problem, as Rou sseau first recognized, then homogeneous materialism really
does suggest a solution. If humanity really cannot be distinguished from the
rest of nature, if there is really no cosmic support for our humanity, then we
are mistaken to define ourselves with reference to our particular selfcon ciou sness. Perhaps self-consciousness and its byproducts-such
as
reason, fear , and pride-can be understood as accidental, unfortunate and
inessential acquisitions of some evolutionary or historical process and not
a part of our genuine being . If we are true to ourselves, then we reject the
"unnatural " unhappiness produced by our unnecessary desires. Surely the
modern, technological, "bourgeois" preoccupation with time and mortality
i not healthy or "life-enhancing" and probably not even really conducive
to mere self-preservation. It could only be viewed as natural if one deviates
from a wholly consistent materialism, and the partisan of technology knows
there is no unproblematic method for accounting for such deviations.
If our humanity prevents us from being genuinely happy or content
and there is no cosmic support for our "godlike" pretensions, then we can
only be happy by "forgetting" our humanity and lapsing into animality.
The most significant discovery of the technological view of the world is
there is no such thing as human happiness. Stripping away our "historical"
acquisition of reason or self-consciousness and the insatiable desires it
generates, we find that our natural state of being is a simple and sweet sentiment of existence.
This feeling, in its way, is god like in its self-sufficiency. Its "reveries"
take us away from awareness of our neediness. It allows us to be wholly idle
without guilt. We may still desire to engage in activities, but only those
which require no mental or bodily exertion and the significance of which we
do not feel compelled to give an account. We can only be wholly content
with what we are when we are only aware of our "feelings" at the present
moment. Time has disappeared, and we are, in a way, at leisure.
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We are only conscious enough to affirm simply the goodness of lit
We have no "historical" sense of our past or "technological" calculatioe.
for our future . "Scarcity" has been overcome not through our unparallel~
productivity, but by purging ourselves of those human desi res Which
brought scarcity into being. The ultimate scarcity is scarcity of time, and
this scarcity can be overcome by beings which are really morta l only by los.
ing consciousness of the fact of their mortality or at least of its
significance. •3
We have freed ourselves from the materialist's self-conscious
"knowledge" that his own death is the ultimate evil. We resemb le Socrates
in our ignorance concerning the nature of death, and we resemble the
"Stoic" in our freedom from the fear generated through pre occupation
with the fate of our bodies." Hence our leisure resembles that of the
aristocrat in its freedom from materialistic necessity and in its fo rgetfulness
of the significance of our dependence on our bodies and on othe r beings. It
lacks, of course, the aristocrat's consciousness of his own human
excellence."
Marxism, critical theory (the Frankfurt School, particular ly Herben
Marcuse), and behaviorial or behavorist social science all follow Rousseau
in criticizing the technological view of the world and its human product-the
fearful bourgeois individual-with
reference to a project to
eliminate human self-consciousness or, in other words, to bring history to
an end . For Rousseau, the disappearance of self-consciousness points to the
apparently austere and lazy existence of beings which are easi ly satisfied.
For critical theorists, the disappearance of self-consciousness mean s the end
to repression or sublimation. There will no longer be any reaso n to defer immediate gratification of bodily eros. Losing ourselves in this eros will
somehow be both the cause and effect of our overcoming of time's
scarcity. 46
Rousseau is more consistent than the critical theorists in seeing that the
disappearance of self-consciousness will radically simplify the polymorphous character of human eros. Even human sexual respo nse owes its
distinctiveness to the fact that it cannot help but be affec ted by the
phenomenon of self-consciousness." But contemporary radica ls are more
effectually moved by critical theory's promise that it is possible to retain the
joys of human self-indulgence while losing the "alienation" of human selfconsciousness. It promises that at the end of history universa l leisure or
freedom from necessity will somehow be human leisure, forgetti ng or ignoring that this promise is inconsistent with the homogeneous mate rialism on
which the Marxiam idea of the end of history is based. Similar ly, the attractiveness of contemporary radica lism to the intellectual as an ideal is only
possible because he does not recognize that everything that make s an intellectual happy-art,
philosophy, literature, and so forth-wi ll also disappear with the end of history. As Alexandre Kojeve, the indivi dual who in
our time has thought through most thoroughly what the end of history
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uld mean, observes, "post-historical
animals of the species Homo
wo ;ens(which will live amidst abundance and complete security)" will
;~~nstruct their edifices and works of art as birds build their nests and
ciders spin their webs, would perform musical concerts after the fashion of
/ogs and cicadas, would play like young animals, and would indulge in love
r adult b eas t s. " 0
!'ke
1
The beast is wholly an animal. Consequently, he should not be confused
'th Nietzsche's
"last man"
or Tocqueville's
"gentle,
peaceful"
WI
lave-both of whom still display residual humanity in their total dominaion by bourgeois fear. An animal is really content; his fear is merely int unctive and momentary and not an essential part of his being. Everything
the "last man" wants-freedom
from fear, suffering, and toil-the animal
actually possesses in a self-sufficient way. He can really enjoy leisure.
Although socialist intellectuals and political leaders are dissatisfied
with their own and humanity's present condition, they do not, as we have
aid, view themselves as destroying humanity itself. They themselves are
dominated, in a way even greater than the capitalist entrepreneur,
by
aristocratic pride. They have devoted their lives to activities which are
characteristically understood as special opportunities to manifest one's own
freedom from materialistic necessity. Accepting the truth of technology's
homogeneous materialism, however, they also need visible and tangible
evidence of their excellence. Consequently, they must successfully pursue
the concrete actualization of an ideal which is consistent with the truth of
homogeneous materialism. They see the self-contentment
of aristocratic
lei ure as a parasitic illusion based on the unjustifiable enslavement of being essentially no different from themselves. They have no right not to be
"productive,"
to change the world in the service of human need
democratically and materialistically conceived.
As we have seen, the only ideal really consistent with technology's
homogeneous materialism is the destruction of human distinctiveness and
the reintegration of humanity into "brute" nature, which is the "end of
hi tory." The socialist thinker characteristically
hides this truth from
himself, at least to some extent, because he does not want to deny his own
humanity. Why should he heroically risk his life to create a world in which
heroism could not be recognized? Why should he "apply" his thoughts to
create a world in which there would be no self-conscious thought? Hence he
u ually understands himself as engaged in quasi-Christian quest to universalize human dignity, forgetting that dignity will always be a problem
whenever there is consciousness of one's own mortality and where there is
no such consciousness there can be no human dignity. The socialist intellectual really resembles the capitalist entrepreneur in his immersion in a
"selfish" illusion which really stands in opposition to both aristocratic
leisure and the leisure he is working to create. The aristocrat would say that
he, too, is unable to regard himself as a human being. His problem is not excessive pride but an insufficient appreciation of his genuine self-worth.
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It is remarkably difficult to distinguish the prideful materi alism of th
social scientist from that of the socialist intellectual. They share the sa e
task: the transformation of human beings into docile, cooperative , " spec~e
beings" which will be wholly content with their environment. While t:
socialist intellectual acknowledges the need to use revolutionary terror, the
social scientist holds that the task can be completed through the proper u e
of persuasion. The social scientist is accused by the Marxist of being blind~
naive concerning the sternness of political life, and he replies that there
much evidence in our time that things are progressing his way.
s
The social scientist diffuses the view that human freedom and dignity
are illusions, that there is no distinction between human and non-human
nature, that homogenous materialism is wholly true. In this way, he
prepares the world to accept social conditioning based on his technological
expertise. He will eradicate poverty, misery, and other socia l problems by
purging humanity of the illusions which generate pride, aggressiv eness, and
competitiveness, or, more generally, individuality. Like the socia list, he will
eliminate privacy in the name of social harmony, but he will do it in a
peaceful, "evolutionary" manner. He will abolish humanity in the name of
a herd-like contentment which resembles leisure, but its slavish dependence
on a socialist or social scientific bureaucracy makes it somethi ng different
from leisure. 49
The social scientist in his pride exempts himself from his ho mogeneous
materialism, although he has no coherent argument for why he can do so.
By reducing human beings to brutes which can be controlled by him the way
a shepherd contols his flock, he has, in a way, turned himse lf into a god.
But is the manipulation of thoughtless and will-less beings in tas k worthy of
a god or even of a genuinely human being? Like the socialist, the social
scientist strives to create a world in which he will have no place to manife t
his excellence. Eventually, he must come to realize that his dest ruction of
humanity necessarily includes his own humanity . At best he will be bored,
at worst he will fall into profound despair. He will not experience the selfcontentment which is the foundation of leisure.
We have yet to account for those who accept the technolog ical view of
reason and still oppose the destruction of humanity. Here it is eas y to point
to Nazism, Fascism, and certain variants of existentialism. The grandfather
of all these movements is Nietzsche, who attempted the noble but probabl y
impossible task of giving modern materialism an aristocratic inte rpretation.
The history of reason, Nietzsche argues, with Marx (and perha ps Hegel), i
the history of the progressive destruction of the "aristocratic"
illusions
which make humanity possible. The progressive unfo lding of the
technological view of the world shows that the Socratic quest for rational
self-knowledge necessarily culminates in the experience of nihi lism . io
Nihilism is the mood or view in which nothing matters beca use there i
no support for the distinctions which give human life meaning-s uch as the
ones between good and evil and noble and base. If rati onal self-
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nsciousness is equivalent to nihilism, Nietzsche asserts, then one must
cobordinate reason to mstmct.
· .
If one wants to oppose h umamty's
.
"ra~nal" project of self-distruction, then one must find a foundation for
11
istocratic distinctions in physiological phenomena. "Homogeneous"
araterialism must be replaced by "aristocratic" materialism. If the death of
~od means that man can no longer exist as a being "inbetween" beast and
then he must will to become more than man-a superman.
go'd
ietzsche, of course, cannot give a logos for why he opposes man's
brutalization in this way. He cannot say why anything should matter to
orneone who has experienced nihilism, or, what is the same thing, the full
ignificance of the death of God. Because he lacks such a logos, his project
ornes to sight as pure spiritedness or will. Part of its "effectual truth" will
be to motivate blindly fanatic warriors-not
aristocrats
properly
understood . To go down fighting freely and fiercely is man's final revenge
against the nihilism of self-consciousness; "man will rather will nothingness
than not will at all." "
Because Nietzsche opposes the nihilism he sees in both Socratic selfonsciousness and bestial self-contentment, then, he sees man as essentially
a courageous but not a thoughtful being. In so doing, he opposed the
possiblity of human leisure. The leisure of the aristocratic philosopher and
the Christian are based on lies which are now incredible. The leisure of the
beast is not worthy of human beings.
ietzsche is superior to his socialist and social scientific adversaries in
hi candid acknowledgment of his pride and his partisanship on behalf of
hi own excellence. Consequently, he asserts that he will not accept a world
in which a man like himself could not exist. He, however, shares the incoherence of his materialistic adversaries because he cannot articulate why
hi pride does and should exist within the materialistic perspective he accepts as true.
Consider that the unintentional but real product of Nietzsche's
teaching, National Socialism, bases its aristocratic assertiveness on "scientific racism" -a monstrous combination of aristocratic pride and modern
materialism which, in a vulgarly Nietzschean manner, claims to discern
humanly relevant distinctions in physiological phenomena.
National
ocialism, of course, is a distortion of Nietzsche's teaching, but one which
eems inevitable in view of the incoherence and obscurity of his own
aristocratic alternative. Because of its continuing attachment to "scientific"
tandards, National Socialism was destined to fail as a project to destroy the
tyranny of technology's homogeneous materialism. 52 Nevertheless, its contant and unprecedently destructive motion was a sign of its fanatic opposition to the nihilism inherent in the technological understanding of "free
time."
What links Nietzsche together with his modern opponents is his conclusion that the technological view of truth is true. What is rational can be
determined only according to the "empirical" criterion of visible and tangi107

ble evidence. Consequently, human reality is nothing other th an histo
that is, what human beings have made. If realism is equiva lent
0
historicism, then there is no possiblity of human leisure. Yet this possibilit
as we have seen, must be available if we are to be satisfied with our humani~•
and hence if we are to control by transcending the monstrous creations ~
0
technological thought. It would be foolish and futile to attempt to ove
rcome technology by destroying its useful products, but it is essenti al to how
how these products can contribute to living a purposeful or complet
human life. Otherwise we will continue to attempt to lose ourselves corn~
pletely in materialistic economic, social and political projects to destroy the
source of our dissatisfaction.
We have no choice but to question the view that the techno logical view
is a complete view of the world. Even if we doubt our ability to change our
world, we still have ourselves to consider. There are no doubt many ways of
undertaking this project, but I will mention only two. We can join Stanley
Jaki and others in pursuing the possibility that recent deve lopments in
"cosmological" studies really do not supijort the technological conception
of a homogeneous, infinite universe . Perhaps there is growing evidence for
the Aristotelian or Christian view that the world exists for and even wa
made for man, and we need not understand ourselves as ceaseless ly striving
to establish our humanity in a wholly hostile environment. Realism may be
something other than historicism. 53
We can also, in a more "anthropological"
fashion, attem pt to show
that the technological view that death is the greatest evil for human being
(who are essentially bodies in motion) is not true . This is possib le, I think,
without affirming what seems to be the inhuman and incredib le Socratic
view that fear of death is unreasonable because we know nothing certain
about it. We know enough to suppose that death is in some sense an evil
unless supernatural salvation is available. Without consciousness of our
mortality, however, we would not be human beings, and we have presented
ample evidence of our great-if perhaps unreasonable-attachm
ent to our
humanity. If "humanity" can be conceived as the greatest good for human
beings, then surely death is an acceptable evil. 5 • Only at this point can we affirm the goodness of the technological product of "free time": freedom
from necessity is only good if it is freedom for human beings.
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